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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT:
A CONSIDERATION OF THE
THIRD CLAUSE OF t605(a)(2)
The concept of sovereign immunity is based on
the idea of pmtecting the dignity of sovereign entities,
a principle worthy of continuation. However, when it
is applied unfettered, it has the possibility of obstructing justice. Until 1952 the United States courts, under
State Department consent, applied immunity to all sovereigns that were brought before them. In 19.')2, the
State Department issued a letter drafted by Jack B.
Tate which introduced the theory of restrictive sovereign immunity to U.S. courts. The Tute letter held
that governments brought before U.S. courts must still
be considered immune from jurisdiction for their public
acts (jure imperii), but must be held accountable for
their private acts (jure gestionis). 1
The Tate letter was an attempt to allow governments to go about their administrative responsibilities
unhindered, but allow private parties to have recourse
for wrongs committed by a government outside those
administrative responsibilities. Although it was a step
in the right direction, it was not all that was needed.
The area encompassing public and private acts was left
extremely vague and open.
Congress, recognizing that further codification
was necessary, passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FS[ A) in 1976. The purpose of the act is to
lay down a standard that can be uniformly applied to
cases involving a foreign government which claims to

1 Deborah Schloss, "Cllllllllerd,,1 Activity in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Ad of 1976," JuumilL2fJll~tnatiQJlaLLillY
"lid Economics 14 (Nllmber 1 1980l: 163.
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be immune fl"Om jurisdiction. Obviously the FSIA cannot give extraterritorial jurisdiction, but it does pl'Ovide the exceptions of immunity applicable in U.S.
courts. Although the purpose of the act is on target,
the FSIA is criticized fOl' allowing ambiguity to run
rampant within the act itself.2 To understand the
problems arising from the application of the FS[A to
commercial actions brought to court, the purpose of
the act needs to be examined more closely. Two
points within the third clause of subsection 1605(a)(2)
in particular need to be analyzed: what constitutes 1) a
commercial activity, and 2) a direct effect in the
United States.

Introduction to the FSIA
As stated earlier, one of the purposes of the restrictive theory of immunity is to bring governments to
a position of equality in the marketplace. One of the
purposes of the FSIA is to codify the application of
that principle. Within subsection 1605(a)(2) the conditions that al'e necessary for a sovereign to lose its
immunity through a commel'cial activity and fall within
the jurisdiction of the U oS. courts are enumerated.
The third clause of subsection 1605(a)(2) follows:
[F)oreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
a court of the United States in any case-olin which the
action takes place) outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States;

2Joseph W, Dellapena, "Suing Foreign Governments and
Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity," C!!mmerciul1,ilw JOUr:
nal85 (June/July 1980):232,
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It is obvious that the intent of Congr'ess here is to
allow private individuals--whether personal orcorporate
entities--to redress grievances suffered at the hands of
a foreign sovereign while engaged in commerce. 3 By
applying the restrictive pr'inciple of sovereign immunity
in a codified form there will be two positive effects:
(l) commerce is enhanced by allowing private individuals to confidently proceed into commercial transactions with sovereigns knowing that they are not left
without defense, and (2) impress upon sovereigns their
responsibilities as trading partners. 4 Before this concept can be applied however, it must be understood
what constitutes a 'commercial act'. Briefly scanning
the development of this term through history will allow
for a more stable understanding of the present conceptions.

Public and Private Acts
The basis of the distinction between the types of
acts a state can participate in comes from the French
idea of public and private acts. While this distinction
began within the ~~rench domestic judicial system, the
French soon applied it to international cases and the
theory spread rapidly.5
In attempting to make the public and private dis-

3Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 647 F.2d
311(1981).
4Robert H. Yaffe, "Direct Financial Effect Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act,"
1982):363.

L.aw~[the.Ame.rkas

14 (Fall

5Dellapena, "Suing Foreign Governments and their Corporations," p. 230.
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tinction, two different tests developed: 1) the nature
test, and 2) the purpose test. The nature test I'educes
the issue to the nature of the act. 6 In other words, if
the act were something which could be performed by a
private individual, the act would be a private act and
not immune. This would apply to acts like entering
into contracts and managing pmperty, things that do
not require the power of the state to perform. The
purpose test on the other hand ignores the nature of
the act and judges only the purpose of the act: why
was the contract entered into? If it is determined
that the contract was entered into fOI" a public pUt·pose--c1othing the military for example--then that contractual act which the nature test would allow to be
adjudicated would be immune under the purpose test.
The question of what test to apply to cases in
U.S. courts spawned a dispute between the State Department and the courts; the State Department held to
the nature test while the courts held to the purpose
test. It was to settle disputes like this and help solidify the application of immunity that the FSIA was enacted. The FSIA gives the decision making power for
such cases to the courts, but also holds that they must
apply the nature test to questions of immunity.
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by .·eference to its
purpose. 7

6 Ibid ., p.2:l l.
7 Public Law 94-583, ss 1603(.1).
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While it is c1eal' that the natUl'e test must be applied,
another distinction must be made: was the act in question itself a commercial action, or was it a sovereign
action committed through a commercial facade? This
is a determination that usually must be made independent of the nature test. This distinction is brought
out in Arango v, Guzman Travel Advisors Corp. 621
F.2d 1371. The court ruled that although Guzman was
obviously involved in political activities, the specific
act in question stemmed directly from their commercial
activities in the United States and therefore, was not
covet'ed by sovel'eign immunity. Thus, it is not the
nature of the entity, but the nature of the act that
must be ruled on.

Establishing Direct Effects--Case Examples
With the nature test for a commercial activity
established, there still remain numerous ambiguities.
With the limitless number of possible cases, thel'e is no
feasible way to codify a perfect definition of commercial activity. Therefore, this penumbral area will have
to be pronounced individually by each court to hear
such a case, using the guidelines of the FSIA.
Although not perfect, it appears that this is as close
as the courts can come to erecting a uniform standard
to solidify the commercial activity clause. With this in
place, the focus needs to be shifted to perhaps the
most problematic clause of 1605(a)(2): what constitutes
"a direct effect in the United States'?"
Through its case history, the direct effect clause
has proven to be extremely fluid. There are,howevel',
three common threads that can be seen when examining cases where the jurisdiction of the case has turned
on this clause: 1) there must be certain minimum contacts between the acts of the sovereign in question
and the United States, 2) the act's effects in the Uni-
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ted States must be foreseeable and the act must be
engineered, and 3) the effects in question must be directly felt in the United States.
[n order to illustrate these common points, four
cases will be compared, with additional examples used
when helpful. These cases are: 1) Texas Trading v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria 647 F.2d 200 (U)81), 2)
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 764 F.2d 1101 (1985), 3)
Reale {nterns, (nco V. Federal Repllblic of Nigeria 5{)2
F.Supp 56 (1983), and 4) East Europe Domestic International Sales Corp. V. Terra. 467 F.Supp 383 (1979).
By looking at these cases and applying the thl'ee previously mentioned common threads, it is possible to
gain some insight into the subtleties of the direct effects clause.
Rather than attempting to give the facts of each
case as well as an explanation of the court's action,
attention will be focused on the common threads, with
reference to the court's action on each case as it applies.
First to be examined is the criteria for what constitutes minimum contacts. While the case which set
the standard for minimum contacts was not dealing
with immunity it did raise the question of the court's
jurisdiction. s The same principle applies to immunity
cases; the court must first establish jurisdiction and to
make this determination in cases involving a sovereign
as the defendant, the court must establish that there
are indeed minimum contacts, A very lose reading of
the above cases might suppose that direct financial
effects could be considered sufficient to establish minimum contact. Upon closer examination, however, it is
found that financial effects within the U.S. are not

8International Shoe v. State of Washington
310 (1945).

et ill 326 US
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enough; in each case the financial effect must be
linked to other contacts within the United States.
Texas Trading, a case that has been thought by
some to be the first case to establish financial har'm as
sufficient minimum contact, can be seen to contain
deeper commercial connections within the United States
than the financial loss to the corporation. 9 When determining their' jurisdiction, the court made note of the
harmed corporation being an American entity, but the
court also noted that the method of payment was to be
conducted through an American institution within the
jurisdiction of the court. Thus, not only had an
American entity been financially harmed, it had been
harmed by a sovereign availing itself of Amer'ican
banking institutions.
This same principle can be seen in Reale. In
many ways Reale mirrors Texas Trading, but one major
difference is the location of the bank of payment. In
Rcale, payment was to be made through a Spanish
bank. The minimum contacts were established by the
Nigerian use of an American financial firm-- Morgan--as
a link in the chain of payment.
It is clear from the record testimony that, although the
documents culled for hy the letter of credit could be presented to Banco de Bilb,lO, paymeut could be effeeted only by
Morgan in New York, to whom Banco de Bilbao would be
obliged to transmit the papers presented to obtain payment.
That being so, the case clearly falls within the FSIA, 28
U.S.C. subsection 1605 (a)(2) .... 10

9Yaffe, "[)irect Flllallt"ial Effect Under the Foreign Sovereit-:"n Imlllunity Act," p. ;W:l.
IOReale Intel"ll., IIIl". v. Federal Repllblic of Nigel'ill 562
F .SII PP 50 ( 198:Jl,
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It would appear from the above that while the
court's interpretation of a direct effect has expanded
to where financial loss is a definite factm', minimum
contacts must still be established for the court to
claim jUl'isdiction under the FSIA.
Likewise, in Callejo it appears that minimum contacts are again guiding the court. While there are
grounds to assert that the commercial action taken by
Bancomer may have actually taken place within the
United States--shifting the issue from the third clause
of 1605(a)(2) to the first clause of that same
paragraph--the court denied this possibility and ruled
on the direct effects clause, The court held that the
breach of the certificates of deposit in question caused
a dir'ect effect within the United States, but this effect appears to be simply financial loss to an individual. The court, however, may have also used the
concept of Amer'ican banking activities to establish
minimum contact within the United States, if not explicitly, at least implicitly. I I
Callejo also makes the point that "the conduct
must have a 'substantial' effect in the United States
'as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
outside the territory. ".12 In other words, the courts
recognize a difference between acts which are fortuitous and those which are engineered. In Callejo, the
courts ruled that the direct effect of Bancomer's action was foreseeable within the United States because
of his extended business dealings with the Callejos.
Also in Reale, a connection was made between the
action, cancelling payment, and its foreseeable effects
within the United States. This almost appears to be

IICallego v. Bancomer, S. A. 764 F.2d 1110-11 (1985).
12 Ibid ., p. III!.
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related to the concept of minimum contacts. Not only
must the sovereign commit an action with direct effects in the United States, the effects of that action
must be foreseeable, and therefOl'e, the act
engineered. 13 This distinction protects the immunity
of sovereigns when an attempt is made to hold them
accountable for fortuitous wrongs. Also, in conjunction with fortuitous wrongs committed, the courts
often hold that the act did not in fact produce a direct effect within the United States. 14
This brings up the last point: the criterion of a
direct effect within the United States. This problem
could easily be separated into two parts: what are the
criteria for (1) a direct effect, and (2) in the United
States.
One of the tests that the courts have applied to
determine if the effect was direct is similar to a test
applied in constitutional law: what was the intent of
the framers? In the case of the FSIA, the courts have
referred to the intent of Congress to allow the courts
jurisdiction over certain types of cases. 15 In each
case, the courts have put forth the notion that they
were ruling on the type of case Congress intended to
remedy with the FSIA. The Second Circuit put it this
way:
The question is, was Ihe effect suffiCiently "direct" and sufficiently "in the Unlled States" that Congress would have
wanted an Amcl'iclln cOlIl'l to hear the case? No ng'id pal'sing of ss 1605(a)(2) shollid lose sight of that purpose. We

13 Ibid.;
'
Reale, p. 57,
1.IHarris v. Intourisl, Moscow 4111 F.sIlPP lOtl2 (1980).
15Callego, p.llll; Reale, p. 57; Texas Trading, p. 311.
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have no doubt that Congress intended to bring suits like
these into Alllerican courts. Hi

The courts also see a limit to this intent and r'ecognize
acts that produce indirect effects in the United States;
in such cases; the courts protect the immunity of the
sovereigns. Two examples examining corporate financial effects illustrate this trend.
In East Europe Domestic lntcmational Sales Corp.
v. Terra., 467 F.Supp 383, the court ruled that the
immunity of Romania should be protected although the
effects of the action--a cancelled contract--would
obviously be felt in the United States. 17 Two points
illuminate the protection of immunity.
First, the
courts held that Terra. had not . projected itself into
the United States market to an extent that would
allow jurisdiction; there were not minimum contacts
established. 18 When compared with Texas Tradinl(,
East Europe had lost potential profits from t.he cancellation of a contract rather than payment. The loss
was only potential; they did not suffer a direct financialloss.
Another example of an indirect financial loss is
found within Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 6n.
National Oil Corp., a Libyan state owned firm, failed to
deliver' oil to a Bahamian subsidiary of an American
corporation. The court held that although an American
corporation suffered a financial loss, it was because of

16Texas Trading, p. 313.
17 Noyes E. Leech, Covey T. OlivPl', and ,Joseph M Sweeney,
The Internati.!HHI.LLe~LSY:ililli1 (Mineola, NY: The Foundation
Press, 1981), pp. 334-40.
18 Ibid ., p. 338.
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an action that directly affected a Bahamian firm, and
only secondarily affected the American parent COI'pol'ation. Therefore, while it is obvious that there was a
financial effect within the U.S., the court held that
the effect was not directly within the U.S.

Conclusion
It is obvious that although Congress intended to
codify a rule which would bring sovereigns and private
entities into a more equal relationship in the marketplace, there remains an amorphous element to sovereign
immunity in commercial matters. Two symptoms of this
element remain: what are the criteria which must be
met to establish (1) a commercial activity, and (2) a
direct effect in the United States. As cases develop
that fall into the penumbral areas of these exceptions,
the courts have sevemI avenues through which to
reach their decision. One option traces the intent of
Congress to see if it encompasses the case at bar.
Another avenue goes back through the case histm'y of
the FSIA looking for common applications. Regardless
of the avenue chosen--or more properly the mixtures
of avenues--the application of the FSIA appear's to
have been fairly fluid in the past, and promises to
remain so in the future.
Congress certainly did not enumerate each act
that would be considered commercial, or which effects
would be considered di."ect; to expect such an enumeration from eithe.· Congress or the courts is unreasonable. Congress did, however, enlighten their intended
meaning of commercial activity, and the courts are
applying three principles to cases which come before
them: (1) there needs to be minimum contact with the
act in question and the United States; (2) the effects
must have been foreseeable and the act in question
engineered, not fortuitous; and (3) the effects must be
directly felt in the United States.
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As long as the courts of the United States function under the present Constitution which allows judges
to weigh the facts and pronounce their opinions, this
is probably the greatest extent to which sovereign immunity can be codified_ Although the individual I-emains at some risk in the marketplace, the FSIA increases the level of order and certainty found in the
application of the principle of restrictive sovereign
immunity_

DOUGLAS MADSEN
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